Book Review: 'Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge'

Dust jacket illustration for the U.S. edition of Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge. Design by Matt Yee. (C) 2015 Viking (a Penguin Random House imprint)

On November 3, 2015, Penguin Random House UK imprint Viking published Ardennes 1944: Hitler’s Last Gamble, a book by historian Antony Beevor about the biggest battle fought in Western Europe during World War II. Officially known as the Ardennes Counteroffensive, the engagement that began on December 16, 1944 and ended six weeks later is better known by its more popular nomenclature – the Battle of the Bulge. (The battle earned its nickname due to the bulge-shaped salient in Allied lines on situation maps – official and those published in U.S. and British newspapers during that cold, miserable, and violent winter battle.)

Published in the U.S. as Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge, the book is Beevor’s first World War II book that focuses on a campaign that was overwhelmingly a struggle between Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht and SS divisions and two American armies – Courtney Hodges’ First and George S. Patton Jr.’s Third, with only some support from Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s mostly Anglo-Canadian 21^st Army Group. (As another book on the subject not-so-subtly points out in its cover, the Battle of the Bulge is, even today, the biggest single engagement in U.S. Army history.

On 16 December, 1944, Hitler launched his ‘last gamble’ in the snow-covered forests and gorges of the Ardennes. He believed he could split the Allies by driving all the way to Antwerp, then force the Canadians and the British out of the war. Although his generals were doubtful of success, younger officers and NCOs were desperate to believe that their homes and families could be saved from the vengeful Red Army approaching from the east. Many were exultant at the prospect of striking back.

The Ardennes offensive, with more than a million men involved, became the greatest battle of the war in western Europe. American troops, taken by surprise, found themselves fighting two panzer armies. Belgian civilians fled, justifiably afraid of German revenge. Panic spread even to Paris. While many American soldiers fled or surrendered, others held on heroically, creating breakwaters which slowed the German advance.

The harsh winter conditions and the savagery of the battle became comparable to the eastern front. And after massacres by the Waffen-SS, even American generals approved when their men shot down surrendering Germans. The Ardennes was the battle which finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht. – Dust jacket blurb, Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge

In Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge, Beevor tells the complex and fascinating story of how Adolf Hitler – acting on impulse and deliberately ignoring reality – made the decision to launch an offensive in the forested and hilly region known as the Ardennes at a briefing on September 16, 1944. The German army – once the terror of all Europe – had been forced to withdraw from most of France after being defeated at Normandy. British and American divisions had liberated Belgium, including Antwerp, Europe’s largest port city, while Canadian forces were attempting to clear the Wehrmacht out of the Channel coast. Combined with the Soviet armies’ advances in the crumbling Eastern Front, the Third Reich’s strategic predicament looked dire to many of the regime’s military professionals.

 Not to Hitler. At a daily briefing at his headquarters – the Wolf’s Lair – in Rastenburg, East Prussia, the ailing, prematurely aged (he was, in September 1944, only 55 years old, yet looked older and frailer), and harried dictator was listening to Gen. Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, as he described the situation on the Western Front when inspiration struck.

“On 16 September, the day before Market Garden was launched, Hitler surprised his entourage at the Wolfsschanze when he summoned another meeting after the morning situation briefing. Generaloberst Alfred Jodl was just speaking of the scarcity of heavy weapons, ammunition, and tanks on the western front, when, as General der Flieger Kreipe noted in his diary: ‘Fṻhrer interrupts Jodl. Decision by the Fṻhrer, counter-attack from the Ardennes, objective Antwerp.”

Hitler’s dream was to amass an attack group of 30 new Volksgrenadier and armored (panzer) divisions, supplemented by several panzer divisions transferred from the hemorrhaging Eastern Front. Then, under cover of bad weather which would ground Allied air forces, these forces, led by the Sixth Panzer Army, would emerge from the forests and hills of the Ardennes and drive a wedge – physical as well as political – between the Americans and the Anglo-Canadians, capture Antwerp, and perhaps even drive the British back to the sea in a second Dunkirk. True to form, Hitler set an unrealistic target date: November 1, 1944.

Though most of Hitler’s professionally-trained generals – including Field Marshal Walter Model, who was one of the dictator’s loyalists – thought the scheme was mad, plans for Operation Autumn Mist were drawn up. The German army leadership had been cowed into submission by the utter failure of the July 20, 1944 bomb attempt on Hitler’s life, and even though the generals slated to command the forces assigned to the Ardennes Counter-Offensive thought the chances of success were slim, they obeyed. The only concession to reality Hitler made during the planning stages of the operation was to postpone Null-Tag (Zero Day) from November 1 to December 16 so that fuel, ammunition, and above all, enough manpower could be amassed in the assembly areas for the attack.

In Ardennes 1944, Beevor explains how Allied complacency caused by what he calls “victory fever,” combined with increased security measures that blinded U.S. and British military intelligence, allowed the preparations for Autumn Mist to proceed nearly under the noses of General Omar Bradley’s 12^th Army Group, whose U.S. First Army was the operation’s prime target. As the author and other chroniclers of the Battle of the Bulge have pointed out, the fact that the Germans amassed a large force east of the Ardennes and surprised everyone – from Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower at his headquarters in Reims (France) to the lowest-ranking GI in the front lines – by launching an attack in mid-December was the biggest intelligence failure on the part of the Allies during the entire war.

Beevor, author of several award-winning best-sellers about World War II, covers every aspect of the largest and fiercest battle fought on the Western Front in this fascinating 480-page book, he examines the strategies and tactics employed by both the Allies and the Germans from the fall campaigns in France, the Low Countries, and the German frontier to the bitter struggle in the snow-covered battlefields around places with names that are familiar to World War II buffs – St. Vith, Clervaux, Elsenborn Ridge, Houfalize, the Schnee Eifel, the crossroads at Baugnez near Malmedy, and Bastogne. 

My Take

As he has done in works such as D-Day: The Battle for Normandy and Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943, Beevor tells the story of the Bulge from various points of view. In Ardennes 1944 the reader gets to see The Big Picture of grand strategy as generals on both sides devise plans to outwit and outfight their opponents. As in any great thriller in the tradition of the late Tom Clancy, Beevor sets the stage for the blood-and-guts stories of ordinary soldiers and civilians on both sides by describing some of the behind-the-scenes drama at the higher levels of command, as in this excerpt from the book’s first chapter:

Early on 27 August 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower left Chartres to see the newly liberated Paris. ‘It’s Sunday,’ the Supreme Allied Commander told General Omar Bradley, whom he took with him. ‘Everyone will be sleeping late. We can do it without any fuss.’ Yet the two generals were hardly inconspicuous as they bowled along towards the French capital on their supposedly ‘informal visit’. The Supreme Commander’s olive-drab Cadillac was escorted by two armoured cars, and a Jeep with a brigadier general leading the way.

When they reached the Porte d’Orléans, an even larger escort from the 38^th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron awaited in review order under the orders of Major General Gerow. Leonard Gerow, an old friend of Eisenhower, still seethed with resentment because General Philippe Leclerc of the French 2^nd Armoured Division had consistently disobeyed all his orders during the advance on Paris. The day before, Gerow, who considered himself the military governor of Paris, had forbidden Leclerc and his division to take part in General de Gaulle’s procession from the Arc de Triomphe to Notre-Dame. He had told him instead to ‘continue on present mission of clearing Paris and environs of enemy’. Leclerc had ignored Gerow throughout the liberation of the capital, but that morning he had sent part of his division north out of the city against German positions around Saint-Denis.

The streets of Paris were empty because the retreating Germans had seized almost every vehicle that could move. Even the Métro was unpredictable because of the feeble power supply; in fact the so-called ‘City of Light’ was reduced to candles bought on the black market. Its beautiful buildings looked faded and tired, although they were mercifully intact. Hitler’s order to reduce it to ‘a field of rubble’ had not been followed. In the immediate aftermath of joy, groups in the street still cheered every time they caught sight of an American soldier or vehicle. Yet it would not be long before the Parisians started muttering ‘Pire que les boches’—‘Worse than the Boches’.

Despite Eisenhower’s remark about going to Paris ‘without any fuss’, their visit had a definite purpose. They went to meet General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the French provisional government which President Roosevelt refused to recognize. Eisenhower, a pragmatist, was prepared to ignore his President’s firm instruction that United States forces in France were not there to install General de Gaulle in power. The Supreme Commander needed stability behind his front lines, and since de Gaulle was the only man likely to provide it, he was willing to support him.

Neither de Gaulle nor Eisenhower wanted the dangerous chaos of liberation to get out of hand, especially at a time of frenzied rumours, sudden panics, conspiracy theories and the ugly denunciations of alleged collaborators. Together with a comrade, the writer J.D. Salinger, a Counter Intelligence Corps staff sergeant with the 4^th Infantry Division, had arrested a suspect in an action close to the Hôtel de Ville, only for the crowd to drag him away and beat him to death in front of their eyes. De Gaulle’s triumphal procession the day before from the Arc de Triomphe to Notre-Dame had ended in wild fusillades within the cathedral itself. This incident convinced de Gaulle that he must disarm the Resistance and conscript its members into a regular French army. A request for 15,000 uniforms was passed that very afternoon to SHAEF—the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, there were not enough small sizes because the average French male was distinctly shorter than his American contemporary.

De Gaulle’s meeting with the two American generals took place in the ministry of war in the rue Saint-Dominique. This was where his short-lived ministerial career had begun in the tragic summer of 1940, and he had returned there to emphasize the impression of continuity. His formula for erasing the shame of the Vichy regime was a majestically simple one: ‘The Republic has never ceased to exist.’ De Gaulle wanted Eisenhower to keep Leclerc’s division in Paris to ensure law and order, but since some of Leclerc’s units had now started to move out, he suggested that perhaps the Americans could impress the population with ‘a show of force’ to reassure them that the Germans would not be coming back. Why not march a whole division or even two through Paris on its way to the front? Eisenhower, thinking it slightly ironic that de Gaulle should be asking for American troops ‘to establish his position firmly’, turned to Bradley and asked what he thought. Bradley said that it would be perfectly possible to arrange within the next couple of days. So Eisenhower invited de Gaulle to take the salute, accompanied by General Bradley. He himself would stay away.

On their return to Chartres, Eisenhower invited General Sir Bernard Montgomery to join de Gaulle and Bradley for the parade, but he refused to come to Paris. Such a small but pertinent detail did not deter certain British newspapers from accusing the Americans of trying to hog all the glory for themselves. Inter-Allied relations were to be severely damaged by the compulsion in Fleet Street to see almost every decision by SHAEF as a slight to Montgomery and thus the British. This reflected the more widespread resentment that Britain was being sidelined. The Americans were now running the show and would claim the victory for themselves. Eisenhower’s British deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, was alarmed by the prejudice of the English press: ‘From what I heard at SHAEF, I could not help fearing that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies.’

Sir Antony Beevor is better known in Great Britain and the Commonwealth than he is on this side of the Atlantic, but like Max Hastings, he has a modest-but-growing following among American readers and history buffs. 

Perhaps this is because most of Beevor's books are not, shall we say, U.S.-centric. Stalingrad, for instance, focuses exclusively on the Eastern Front and Nazi Germany's calamitous defeat near the eponymous city on the Volga River, while Crete 1941 tells the story of history's first massive airborne operation, which involved Axis and British Commonwealth forces on the Greek island of Crete before America's entry into the war. 

But in Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge, the main focus is on how the American contingent of the Western Alliance thwarted Operation Autumn Mist and made Hitler's last gamble a losing proposition. Like Winston Churchill did in a speech to the House of Commons in January 1945, Beevor praises the bravery of the American GIs who delayed and ultimately pushed back the German armies in Belgium and Luxembourg - fighting on rough terrain in the grip of one of the coldest winters recorded in European history. 

A keen observer of the human condition as well as a historian with a passion for research, Beevor not only points out how harebrained Hitler's grand plan was, but he also critiques the Allied high command's performance, particularly during the fall campaigns that led to the Battle of the Bulge. In Ardennes 1944, the author reminds readers that General Eisenhower's forte as Supreme Commander was mostly political as the American military's main proponent of inter-Allied unity, rather than as a purely military leader. Throughout the book, Ike's command style – which reflects the American warfighting tradition of allowing subordinate commands to fight battles based on general directives rather than reins-in-hands commands – is contrasted to those of Hitler’s.

Whereas the Fṻhrer was fond of personally overseeing – and even micromanaging – battles he had personally planned, Eisenhower was comfortable with coming up with a clearly-defined strategic objective and then letting his commanders on the field – Bradley, Patton, and Hodges – figure out the specifics on their own.

This is the main reason why Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery became Ike’s bete noir throughout the various campaigns in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Northwest Europe. Montgomery – or, as the British press and his troops called him, Monty – was Britain’s most admired field general as a result of his victory at El Alamein. A competent commander and excellent trainer, Montgomery had certain skills that led to his assignment as ground commander for the invasion of Normandy.

But, as his compatriot Beevor and other historians point out, Monty was insufferably arrogant, convinced that he was a master strategist, and devoid of “emotional intelligence.”  Like many senior British general officers – and the British press – he looked down on his American counterparts and was convinced that he – and not Ike – should be the leader of all Allied ground forces in the West.

Monty’s constant demands to be given command of “a main thrust” in his sector and his dysfunctional relationship with Ike and other American generals – especially Patton – play a huge role in how the Battle of the Bulge was fought, and also in the aftermath. Before the Ardennes counteroffensive, Montgomery’s ability to influence Allied strategy was on the wane, especially after the failure of his pet operation, Market Garden. And as Beevor writes in Ardennes 1944, as Britain’s influence declined and America became the senior partner in the Grand Alliance in 1945, Monty’s stature as a senior commander was greatly diminished, due in no small part to his behavior during the Battle of the Bulge. 

Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge is a fascinating and well-written book. In the words of the Library Journal’s review, "Beevor (The Second World War; D-Day), who has won numerous awards for his works, demonstrates here why he is a celebrated historian and writer. Ardennes 1944, or 'The Battle of the Bulge,' is squarely focused on this critical World War II battle spanning August 1944 to April 1945. The author tracks troop movements and positioning throughout the long conflict, while accounting for decisions made on the field, in the war room, and all the way up the chain of command to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. The writing is both intense and gripping...a wonderful read."